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ARTICLE
CHANGING MINDS: PROSELYTISM,
FREEDOM, AND THE FIRSTAMENDMENT
RICHARD W. GARNETr*
1.
Not long ago, a man armed only with a Bible jumped into the lion's
den at a zoo in Taiwan, proclaiming, "Jesus will save you!" One big cat, it
turned out, was hard hearted, and it attacked the man, but "zoo workers
drove it off with water hoses and tranquilizer guns."' Whatever this mod-
ern-day amalgam of Paul the Apostle and Daniel the Prophet lacked in pru-
dence, he left little room to doubt his zealous determination to take up and
fulfill Christ's charges to his disciples: "Fear not" and "teach ye all na-
tions." 2 And here is another item for the creative-evangelism file, taken
from a recent issue of the Wall Street Journal: reporting on the "wave of
religious revival" sweeping across China, the Journal's front page detailed
the case of an enterprising woman, Su Xueling, who "decided to run [her]
business to spread [her] religion."3 So, she has started using the proceeds
from her company's "Gospel Noodles" to support an evangelical Christian
seminary.4
These and many other, more sober stories and events both illustrate
and confirm the contemporary salience of "proselytism" and the problems
* Lilly Endowment Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. A
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in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the 2004 Culture of Law Lecture Series co-sponsored by
the Intercultural Forum Chair for the Culture of Law and the Center for Catholic Studies and the
Terrence J. Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy at the University of St.
Thomas, Minnesota. Thanks are due to Amy Barrett, Patrick Brennan, Nicole Garnett, John Na-
gle, Bob Rodes, Michael Scaperlanda, Tom Shaffer, Steve Smith, Rob Vischer, and Reginald
Whitt for their comments, suggestions, and criticism. I should note that this essay was drafted and
presented before the death of Pope John Paul II on April 2, 2005.
1. MSNBC, Man Tries to Convert Lions to Jesus, Gets Bitten: 46-Year-Old Leaps into Den
at Taipei Zoo, Calls Beasts to Christianity, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id16396422/ (Nov. 3,
2004).
2. Matthew 28:10, 19.
3. Charles Hutzler, Business Mission: Mixing Religion and Noodles Lands Ms. Su in Hot
Water, Wall St. J. Al (June 2, 2005).
4. Id.
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thought to attend it. As Paul Griffiths has observed, proselytism is a "topic
enjoying renewed attention in recent years[,] . . . largely because it is in-
creasingly obvious that religious commitments and conflicts are and will
remain central to the reconfiguration of global politics that began in 1989."'
John Witte has similarly linked the growing awareness of and sensitivity to
the proselytism problem with the "modem democratic evolution [that] has
helped to catalyze a great awakening of religion around the globe."6 Not
surprisingly then, the practice, aims, and effects of proselytism are increas-
ingly framed not merely in terms of piety and zeal; they are seen as matters
of geopolitical, cultural, and national-security significance as well.
To mention a few examples: After the fall of Baghdad, the com-
mentariat was abuzz with alarm over the prospect of destabilizing Christian
missionary activity in Iraq.7 The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate has-with
at least tacit support from political leaders in that country-criticized
harshly the Holy See and Protestant missionaries alike for invading Ortho-
dox "canonical territory."8 In India, Hindu nationalists have strongly and
stridently condemned religious leaders and religious-freedom advocates-
including Pope John Paul 11-for meddling in local affairs by criticizing
that country's anti-conversion laws, 9 and Naxali rebels have violently ex-
pelled Christian converts from their villages."0 The Vietnamese govern-
ment has started enforcing its new "Ordinance on Religions and Beliefs,"
which requires, among other things, registration of religious groups and
5. Paul J. Griffiths & Jean Bethke Elshtain, Proselytizing for Tolerance, 127 First Things
30, 30 (Nov. 2002).
6. John Witte, Jr., Human Rights and the Right to Proselytize: Inherent Contradictions? 94
Am. Socy. Intl. L. Procs. 182, 182 (2000).
7. See e.g. Steven Waldman, Why We Should Keep Franklin Graham Out of Iraq, http://
slate.nsn.com/id/2081432/ (Apr. 11, 2003) ("Franklin Graham's mission to Iraq will help con-
vince the Arab world that America is out to convert Muslims to Christianity."); Kenneth Wood-
ward, Graham's Crusade: Should Evangelicals Invade Iraq? 130 Commonweal 9, 9 (June 6,
2003) ("Common sense dictates that the Pentagon, which will supervise humanitarian efforts in
Iraq, bar these evangelizers and their organizations from entering the country."); Laurie Good-
stein, Seeing Islam as 'Evil' Faith, Evangelicals Seek Converts, N.Y. Times Al (May 27, 2003);
Michelle Cottle, Bible Brigade, The New Republic 16 (Apr. 21, 2003); cf Mark O'Keefe,
Evangelicals Plan to Minister to Iraqis' Needs-Physical and Spiritual, Christianity Today, http:/
/www.christianitytoday.com/et/2003/112/45.0.html (Mar. 27, 2003).
8. See e.g. Frank Brown, Pope's Proposed Ukraine Visit Rankles Orthodox, http:/lwww.
beliefnet.com/story/52/story 52771l.html (Nov. 14, 2000); Willard Francis Jabusch, A Papal
Visit to Russia: Where IsAlexei II's Invite? 128 Commonweal 11, 11 (Mar. 9,2001); Lawrence A.
Uzzell, Letter from Moscow, 93 First Things 16, 16 (May 1999). See also Peter Finn, From
Russia, Sympathy and Suspicion, Wash. Post A20 (Apr. 15, 2005).
9. See e.g. Catholic World News, Pope Raps India's Restraints on Religious Freedom,
http://www.cwnews.comlnews/viewstory.cfm?recnum=23179 (June 26, 2003). In September of
2003, the Supreme Court in India ruled that there is "no fundamental right to convert" to another
religion. See Catholic World News, Indian High Court Denies a Right to Religious Conversion,
http:/Iwww.cwnews.comlnewslviewstory.cfm?recnum=24490 (Sept. 3, 2003).
10. See e.g. ZENIT, Rebels Expel Converts to Christianity, http://www.hrwf.net/html/
2004PDF/India 2004.pdf (June 12, 2004).
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state approval of religious instruction.'' And, in the United States, some
have voiced concerns about advocacy and religious activism by "radical" or
"fundamentalist" Muslims in schools, prisons, and the nonprofit sector. 12
One could go on and on, of course, but it is enough for now to observe
that one of today's more pressing challenges is the conceptual and practical
tangle of religious liberty, free expression, cultural integrity, and political
stability. And it seems particularly appropriate to address this tangle here at
the John Paul II Cultural Center in Washington, D.C. After all, even as
many legislators, legal scholars, and human-rights lawyers are casting a
skeptical eye both on the practice of proselytism and on increasing state-
sponsored efforts to control it, the late Holy Father put the Great Commis-
sion at the heart of his thought, teaching, and ministry, calling time and
again for a "new evangelization." 13 Not long ago, marking the occasion of
the fortieth anniversary of the Second Vatican Council's dogmatic constitu-
tion, Lumen gentium, the Pope exhorted the faithful to "assume with greater
determination" their privilege of proclaiming the Gospel and "build[ing] up
the Kingdom of Christ." The "evangelical animation of the temporal or-
der," he proclaimed, "is a duty of every baptized person."' 4 Indeed, he also
insisted, it is precisely "[t]he social and religious challenges facing human-
ity in our day"' 5-the challenges, that is, of the ongoing "democratic
revolution"-that "call believers to renew their missionary fervor."' 6 At
the same time, a thoroughgoing commitment to the freedoms of conscience
and religion is a hallmark of John Paul II's thinking and teaching, both
before and during his papacy.17 While embracing and promoting both re-
11. Bill Broadway, Intersection of Faith and Freedom; Richmond Group That Promotes Re-
ligious Tolerance Presents Listing of Top 10 Issues, Wash. Post B 11 (Jan. 15, 2005).
12. See e.g. Chuck Colson, Evangelizing for Evil in Our Prisons, Op. J. (June 24, 2002)
(available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110001885); Susan
Schmidt, Spreading Saudi Fundamentalism in U.S.; Network of Wahhabi Mosques, Schools, Web
Sites Probed by FBI, Wash. Post Al (Oct. 2, 2003).
13. See e.g. Pope John Paul 11, Redemptoris missio, No. 3 (Dec. 7, 1990) (available at http://
www.vatican.va/edocs.ENG0219/_INDEX.HTM) ("God is opening before the Church the hori-
zons of a humanity more fully prepared for the sowing of the Gospel. I sense that the moment has
come to commit all of the Church's energies to a new evangelization and to the mission ad gentes.
No believer in Christ, no institution of the Church can avoid this supreme duty: to proclaim Christ
to all peoples."). The "Great Commission" is the popular name for the task Christ entrusted to the
Apostles, i.e., to "teach ...all nations." See Matthew 28:18-20; Mark 16:15 ("[P]reach the
[G]ospel to every creature.").
14. Pope John Paul II, Speech, A Milestone in the Journey of the Church (St. Peter's Square,
Nov. 21, 2004), (available at http://www.zenit.org/english/angelus-eng/visualizza.phtml?sid=
62314).
15. Pope John Paul II, Speech, Eucharist and Mission (Vatican City, Rome, Apr. 19, 2004)
(available at http://www.catholicmission.org/world-mission-sunday.html).
16. Id.
17. The late Holy Father is widely regarded as having been a significant player in the devel-
opment and production of Dignitatis humanae, the Second Vatican Council's 1965 Declaration on
Religious Freedom. See e.g. Pope John Paul II, Speech, Freedom of Conscience and Religion
(Vatican City, Rome, Sept. 1, 1980) (available at http://www.cin.org/jp2ency/freedom.html).
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ligious liberty and "missionary fervor," the Pope has not overlooked the
potential for tension, even conflict, between the two.' 8
The Pope was no doubt aware that what is for Christians our Great
Commission-and, as Paul put it to the Church at Corinth, "Woe is unto
[us] if [we] preach not the Gospel!"" 9-is increasingly regarded by political
and legal theorists as a threat to democracy, security, and freedom. John
Witte captured well the situation:
The problem of proselytism is one of the great ironies of the dem-
ocratic revolution of the modem world.... On the one hand, the
modem human rights revolution has helped to catalyze a great
awakening of religion around the globe.... On the other hand
... the human rights revolution has brought on something of a
new war for souls between indigenous and foreign religious
groups.... Local religious groups resent the participation in the
marketplace of religious ideas that democracy inflicts .... They
resent the massive expansion of religious pluralism that democ-
racy encourages. [And,] [t]hey resent the extravagant forms of
religious speech, press, and assembly that democracy protects.2"
And it is not simply "resent[ment]" that today threatens religious freedom.
Surveying the international human rights landscape a few years ago, Witte
observed that "[t]he world has entered something of a 'Dickensian era' in
the past two decades. We have seen the best of human rights protections
inscribed on the books, but some of the worst of human rights violations
inflicted on the ground. . . . These Dickensian paradoxes of the modem
human rights revolution," he added, "are particularly striking when viewed
in their religious dimensions."21 It turns out that, "[b]eneath shiny constitu-
tional veneers of religious freedom for all and unqualified ratification of
international human rights instruments," a number of countries have
cracked down, in a variety of ways, on religious proselytism, conversion,
and pluralism.22
18. See e.g., Pope Paul VI, Declaration on Religious Freedom: Dignitatis humanae No. 4,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/li_vatican_councilldocuments/vat-ii decl 19651207
dignitatis-humanae en.html (Dec. 7, 1965) ("[Iln spreading religious faith and in introducing re-
ligious practices everyone ought at all times to refrain from any manner of action which might
seem to carry a hint of coercion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unwor-
thy, especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people.").
19. I Corinthians 9:16 (Douay-Rheims); see also Acts 4:20 (Douay-Rheims) ("[W]e cannot
but speak the things which we have seen and heard"); Harold O.J. Brown et al., The Call to
Holiness: A Statement of Evangelicals and Catholics Together, 151 First Things 23, 25 (Mar.
2005) ("The entire mission of the Church may be summarized under the rubric of
evangelization.").
20. John Witte, Jr., A Primer on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism, 31 Cumb. L. Rev.
619, 619 (2000).
21. John Witte, Jr., A Dickensian Era of Religious Rights: An Update on Religious Human
Rights in Global Perspective, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 707, 707-08 (2001) (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 717.
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Not surprisingly, then, it is in the context of contemporary efforts to
protect human rights through international law that we encounter some of
the most important and provocative work concerning the relationship be-
tween proselytism and religious freedom. This essay's topic, though, is not
the interpretation or application of the religious-freedom provisions of the
relevant human-rights instruments.23 Nor is it the conflicts that, unfortu-
nately, persist in many countries and cultural contexts between believers
and missionaries, on the one hand, and local political and religious estab-
lishments, on the other.2 4 These are, no doubt, fascinating and pressing
issues; the goal for this essay, however, is to help solve the "proselytism
problem" by drawing upon what might at first appear to be quite different,
even discordant, sources-namely, the work of Pope John Paul II and the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
Here, in a nutshell, is the argument: Running through and shaping our
First Amendment doctrines, precedents, and values is a solicitude for
changing minds-our own, as well as others'. Put differently, the Amend-
ment is well understood as protecting and celebrating not just expression
but persuasion-or, if you like, proselytism. And so, there are reasons,
grounded in our Constitution and traditions, for regarding proselytism and
its legal protection not as threats to the common good and the freedom of
conscience, but instead as integral to the flourishing and good exercise of
that freedom. What's more, John Paul II sounded a similar note often and
consistently. This same solicitude for persuasion and freedom pervades his
writing. He emphasized, for example, that the Church must take care to
"address[ ] people with full respect [my italics] for their freedom." In so
doing, he added, the Church is guided and inspired by the awareness that it
is "furthering [my italics] human freedom [precisely] by proclaiming [my
italics] Jesus Christ." Thus, the Pope insisted, "[The Church's] mission
does not restrict freedom but rather promotes it." "The Church proposes,"
thereby inviting the exercise of human freedom, "she imposes nothing."25
23. See generally e.g. Robert F. Drinan, Can God and Caesar Coexist? Balancing Religious
Freedom and International Law (Yale U. 2004); Natan Lemer, Religion, Belief and International
Human Rights (Orbis Books 2000); Natan Lerner, Proselytism, Change of Religion, and Interna-
tional Human Rights, 12 Emory Intl. L. Rev. 477 (1998); Tad Stahnke, Proselytism and the Free-
dom to Change Religion in International Human Rights Law, 1999 BYU L. Rev. 251, 255. For an
overview of First Amendment doctrine relating to the regulation and protection of proselytism in
the United States, see Howard 0. Hunter & Polly J. Price, Regulation of Religious Proselytism in
the United States, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 537 (2001).
24. See U.S. Dept. of State, Religious Freedom Report, http://www.state.gov/g/drllrls/irf/
(Sept. 15, 2004); see generally e.g. Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Per-
spectives (John Witte, Jr. & Johan D. van der Vyver eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996).
25. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, at No. 39 (emphasis in original
except where noted); see also e.g. Martin E. Marty, Proselytizers and Proselytizees on the Sharp
Arete of Modernity, in Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of
Proselytism 2 (John Witte, Jr. & Richard C. Martin eds., 1999).
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The claim here, then, is that insights from our First Amendment tradi-
tion both indicate and illustrate that proselytism, properly understood and
fairly defined, is consistent with religious freedom. It is that proposing,
persuading, proselytizing, and evangelizing are at the heart of, and need not
undermine, not only the freedoms protected by the Constitution, but also-
and more important-those that are proclaimed in the Gospels and inherent
in our dignity as human persons.
II.
Before turning specifically to the tasks of defining "proselytism" and
working through that activity's relationship with human freedom, we begin
with a kind of Constitutional Law crash course. Each year, I start my First
Amendment course at Notre Dame Law School with readings and discus-
sion devoted to this question: what are the purposes, central underlying
values, or animating themes of the Free Speech Clause and, more generally,
of the freedom of speech?26 Now, the point of this exercise is neither to
answer nor to discount questions about the Clause's original or other mean-
ing; 7 it is not to lay down fixed markers that will reliably distinguish cor-
rectly from wrongly decided cases or determine precisely the most efficient
or normatively attractive legal doctrines and "tests." It is, instead, only to
begin an examination of, and conversation about, the connections among
the "freedom of speech" (whatever that turns out to mean), the common
good, and the flourishing of persons.
For starters, freedom of speech is often conceived by courts and com-
mentators in terms of the "marketplace of ideas" and as a means of facilitat-
ing the search for truth. That is, free speech serves for many primarily as a
26. We start the class with Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877 (1963); John H. Garvey, What Are Freedoms For? (Harv. U. Press
1996); Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech: and It's a Good Thing, Too (Oxford
U. Press 1994); and, Pope John Paul II, Fides et Ratio (Sept. 14, 1998) (available at http://www.
vatican.valholy-father/john paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii enc 15101998 fides-et-ratio_
en.html).
27. I am inclined to believe, actually, that the meaning and scope of the Free Speech Clause
has, for better or worse, expanded far beyond what was originally expected or envisioned. That is,
it seems to me that we now ask the First Amendment's command-"Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech"-to do more legal work, and we employ it as a standard
against which to judge far more government action, than those who drafted and ratified the provi-
sion intended. There is, in my view, much to Justice Thomas's contention that, when interpreting
the First Amendment's various clauses, courts "must be guided by their original meaning, for
'[t]he Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter. That which it
meant when adopted, it means now."' McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 359
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting S.C. v. U.S., 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905)). Nevertheless,
there is no avoiding the fact that First Amendment doctrine and outcomes in free-speech cases are
powerfully shaped, if not determined, by philosophical premises and normative claims as much as
by text or history. In a sense, the First Amendment-and, in particular, the Free Speech Clause-
has taken on a life of its own, apart from its place in our written Constitution, as a piece of
justiciable and enforceable high political theory.
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truth-discovering (or, perhaps, as an error-revealing) device. "[T]ime has
upset many fighting faiths," Justice Holmes asserted famously in his
Abrams dissent.2 8 Those who recall and appreciate this fact, he continued,
may come to believe even more than they believe the very foun-
dations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is bet-
ter reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution.29
We protect the freedom of speech, so the argument goes, because we be-
lieve that only through the robust, open, uninhibited, and often rough-and-
tumble exchange of ideas are we likely to arrive at the truth-or, at least, to
uncover our mistakes.
Whether or not Holmes was correct in constitutionalizing his prag-
matic skepticism, 3° it is not possible to deny the marketplace metaphor's
power and pedigree. John Milton issued the challenge more than 350 years
ago: "Let [Truth] and [Falsehood] grapple; whoever knew Truth put to the
wors[e], in a free and open encounter?"3 1 And nearly every undergraduate
has probably read of (and likely embraced, at least at first) John Stuart
Mill's defense of open and uncensored discussion as the only reliable route
to "the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth." 32
Another influential way of thinking about the freedom of speech is in
terms of self-government. Here the guiding image is that of a fabled New
England town meeting, of the kind where Norman Rockwell's everyman
might have been inspired to speak.3 The Constitution is thought to protect
speech as a way of facilitating the operations of democratic government and
the equal participation of engaged citizens. Expression is valued, or not,
depending on whether it serves or undermines this end. And for many who
embrace this theme, the First Amendment serves not simply to disable gov-
ernment from silencing or regulating individual speakers, but also to author-
ize public action-including, perhaps, the preferring of some speakers over
others-that, in their view, advances and expands democratic values like
28. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
29. Id.
30. As Frederick Schauer has argued, it is not obvious that the "marketplace of ideas" is
"more likely to lead to knowledge than to error, ignorance, folly, or nonsense." Frederick
Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 19 (Cambridge U. Press 1982).
31. John Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed
Printing 35 (Payson & Clarke Ltd. 1927) (originally published 1644).
32. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 15 (Oxford: Blackwell 1947) (cited in N.Y. Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
33. See e.g. Alexander Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the
People (Harper & Bros. 1960). A reproduction of Norman Rockwell's painting titled Freedom of
Speech is available at http://www.l st-art-gallery.com/artists/Norman%2ORockwell/index-norman.
html (accessed Sept. 16, 2005).
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participation, equality, and diversity. 4 A recent lecture presented by Jus-
tice Stephen Breyer (in which, among other things, he defended campaign-
related regulations from free-speech objections) is an example of this theme
in action. Breyer stated:
[T]he First Amendment's constitutional role is not simply one of
protecting the individual's "negative" freedom from governmen-
tal restraint. The Amendment ... also forms a necessary part of a
constitutional system designed to sustain ... democratic self-gov-
ernment. The Amendment helps to sustain the democratic pro-
cess . . . by . . . encouraging an exchange of views among
ordinary citizens . . . . It thereby helps to maintain a form of
government open to participation.3 5
Still others find in the Free Speech Clause a less utilitarian or commu-
nitarian, and perhaps a more Promethean, core value. For many prominent
scholars, the freedom of speech ultimately serves the expression or (in more
New Age terms) the actualization and realization of the autonomous indi-
vidual. As Thomas Emerson put it,
[tihe right to freedom of expression is justified first of all as the
right of an individual purely in his capacity as an individual. It
derives from the widely accepted premise of Western thought that
the proper end of man is the realization of his character and po-
tentialities as a human being.36
Martin Redish goes even further, insisting that the freedom of speech "ulti-
mately serves only one true value, . . . 'individual self-realization."' 37 (In
this free-speech vision, we might hear echoes of the so-called "mystery pas-
sage," which Justice Kennedy inflicted on the U.S. Reports in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, and which constitutionalized the ambitions of adoles-
cents everywhere to "define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe . . . ."I) Understood in this way, the freedom of speech owes
little to instrumentalist calculations about expression's error-exposing (or
truth-attaining) tendencies. Instead, the idea seems to be that, as Justice
Jackson famously wrote, there is a "sphere of intellect and spirit which it is
the purpose of the First Amendment ... to reserve from all official con-
trol." 39 The "self wants to say what the self wants to say," in other words,
and so the self has a right to say it.
There is, obviously, a great deal more that could be said about the
content and implications of these and other First Amendment theories. The
freedom of speech, it has been said, "check[s] the abuse of official
34. See e.g. Owen M. Fiss, The Irony of Free Speech (Harv. U. Press 1996).
35. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, 252-53 (2002).
36. Emerson, supra n. 26, at 879.
37. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 591 (1982).
38. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion).
39. W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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power."4 Also, it helps to promote social stability and to smooth over so-
cial changes.4 That is, the Free Speech Clause functions as a kind of safety
valve. In Justice Brandeis's words,
Those who won our independence ... knew that... it is hazard-
ous to discourage thought, hope, and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; [and] that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to
discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies ... "
For John Garvey, the freedom of speech facilitates not just the exchange of
ideas in a market, and it represents more than a tactic for avoiding strife and
instilling toleration; instead, the point of free speech is to protect the intrin-
sically valuable human activity of searching for knowledge.4 3 Judge Rich-
ard Posner seems to regard the freedom of speech as a kind of shorthand for
judges' authorization to find an optimal balance of costs and benefits.' 4 Of
course, intellectual gadfly Stanley Fish would likely be amused by all of
these and other free-speech theories and principles, given his view that there
is little more to "free speech" than the rationalizations concocted by those
with power for protecting certain views and messages and silencing
others.45
In any event, Garvey is clearly correct in noting that the Constitution's
Free Speech Clause "serves a number of values-it helps us pursue knowl-
edge, it makes democracy work, it teaches us tolerance, it is a means of
self-expression, and so on."'46 And it should be just as clear that to identify
various ends and values served by the freedom of speech is not necessarily
to interpret and apply the First Amendment correctly. That said, and for
present purposes, I want to propose that near the heart of the Free Speech
Clause, and high on any list of its influences and animating values, should
be a special concern for a particular human activity-namely, changing
minds. In other words, the Clause is not so much "about" one's Whitman-
esque "barbaric yawp," but is instead about advocacy, and persuasion, and
conversion. The paradigmatic First Amendment enterprise is not self-pro-
jection or pop-psychology-style actualization, but is instead a complex and
dynamic transaction in which what is taken to be true is proposed by the
40. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 ABA Research J.
521, 523 (1977).
41. Emerson, supra n. 26, at 884 ("The principle of open discussion is a method of achieving
a more adaptable and at the same time more stable community ... ").
42. Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
43. Garvey, supra n. 26, at 65.
44. See generally Richard A. Posner, Frontiers of Legal Theory ch. 2 (Harv. U. Press 2001).
45. See generally Fish, supra n. 26.
46. John H. Garvey, The Architecture of the Establishment Clause, 43 Wayne L. Rev. 1451,
1453 (1997) (noting also that "[t]his is one reason why one rule can't do all the work that the
speech clause is designed for"). For another detailed collection of free-speech rationales, see G.
Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the Federal
Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. Rev. 829, 892-93.
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one and then accepted or rejected by the other, thereby changing or trans-
forming him in some meaningful way. Stanley Fish has observed,
[W]hen one speaks to another person, it is usually for an instru-
mental purpose: you are trying to get someone to do something,
you are trying to urge an idea and, down the road, a course of
action. These are the reasons for which speech exists.... In any
normal situation you speak for a reason: to inform, to command,
to acquiesce, to ask a question, to further an agenda, to close an
agenda down.47
This seems right. My claim here, though, is not simply about speakers'
motivations, but also about the normative and other justifications for pro-
tecting the freedom of speech that shape the interpretation and application
of the First Amendment.
Consider just a few examples: In Abrams v. United States, the Su-
preme Court upheld the convictions under the Espionage Act of several
First World War-era radicals who had urged in colorful and passionate lan-
guage opposition to that war and support for the Russian Revolution.48 The
defendants' words were, in the Court's view, designed and intended to un-
dermine the American war effort, and therefore fell within the scope of the
Act, which itself did not violate the First Amendment. Justice Holmes, fa-
mously, dissented. Although he conceded the power of government, in
some cases, to respond with censorship to a "clear and imminent danger,"
he insisted nonetheless that "Congress .. .cannot forbid . . . effort[s] to
change the mind of the country," even by "poor and puny anonymities"
preaching "the creed of ignorance and immaturity."49 Justice Holmes re-
turned to this theme a few years later in the Gitlow case, which involved a
prosecution under New York's Criminal Anarchy statute.5" Again in dis-
sent, Holmes questioned the majority's distinction between mere theory and
"incitement," insisting that "every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for
belief and if believed it is acted upon unless some other belief outweighs it
or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth."5" In other
words, the communication of ideas-i.e., speech-aims at a "movement" in
and towards belief; that such a "movement" might occur is not a justifica-
tion for suppressing speech, but is precisely why it is protected.52
47. "There Is No Such Thing as Free Speech ": An Interview with Stanley Fish, 9 Australian
Humanities Rev. (Feb. 1998) (available at http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.auAHR/archive/Issue-Feb-
ruary- 1998/fish.html).
48. 250 U.S. 616.
49. Id. at 627-29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
50. Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
51. Id. at 673.
52. See id. ("If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that
they should be given their chance and have their way.").
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Turn next to what might seem a very different kind of case. In 1980,
the Court considered a free-speech challenge to a New York law prohibiting
advertising that "promot[es] the use of electricity."" Just a few years ear-
lier, the Justices had abandoned the notion that the First Amendment pro-
vides no protection to advertising, or "commercial speech."5 4 Evaluating
New York's ban, the Justices concluded that the "interests" or policy goals
that, in the State's view, justified the restriction on speech-i.e., energy
conservation and fairness in rates-were not obviously advanced or served
by the commercial-speech regulation, while the burdens imposed on speak-
ers' expression were significant.5 5 Justice Blackmun agreed with this con-
clusion, but wrote separately in strong opposition to the notion that the
government may curtail accurate advertising-i.e., speech-about a legal
product simply in order to dampen demand for that product.5 6 Such a regu-
latory effort, he insisted, "strikes at the heart of the First Amendment...
because it is a covert attempt by the State to manipulate the choices of its
citizens, not by persuasion ... but by depriving the public of the informa-
tion needed to make a free choice." 7 "If the First Amendment guarantee
means anything," he continued, "it means that, absent clear and present
danger, government has no power to restrict expression because of the ef-
fect its message is likely to have on the public."58 In other words, he might
have said, whether the issue in dispute is the war effort or electricity use, it
is no justification for suppression that speech might influence decisions,
shape views, or change minds because, in our tradition, this possibility is
precisely why speech is protected. Because the very point of free speech is
to persuade, "the government has no power to restrict expression" on the
ground that it might, in the end, have that effect.59
Another example: In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, the Justices took
up the question whether intimidating and menacing statements, made in the
context of a politically motivated boycott by civil-rights activist Charles
Evers, were proscribable and punishable as "true threats.""0 Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens conceded that the activities of Evers and the boy-
cott organizers went beyond peaceful assembly and discussion among sup-
porters. He accepted the fact that they "sought to persuade others to join
the boycott through social pressure and the 'threat' of social ostracism."'"
The First Amendment is, he acknowledged-as Justice Breyer might to-
53. C. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980).
54. Va. St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
55. C. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co., 447 U.S. 557.
56. Id. at 573-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 574-75.
58. Id. at 575.
59. Police Dept. of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
60. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
61. Id. at 909-10.
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day 62-a "charter for government, '63 but this does not mean that Robert's
Rules or the norms of a town-hall meeting control. "[The First Amend-
ment] extends to more than abstract discussion," Justice Stevens wrote, and
"'[firee trade in ideas' means free trade in the opportunity to persuade to
action, not merely to describe facts."6 4 In our tradition, again, the point of
speech is not only to inform, but also to transform, and the latter process is
not always easy or pleasant.
A recent abortion-related case provides another, final illustration
(though not a vindication, as it happened) of the centrality of persuasion to
the Free Speech Clause. In Hill v. Colorado, the Court upheld a number of
restrictions on expression that were designed to constrain the expression of
pro-life sidewalk counselors near facilities where abortions are performed.65
Even here, though-while concluding that the limits were content-neutral,
and appropriately tailored to important public interests-Justice Stevens ac-
knowledged, as he had in Claiborne Hardware, that "the right to free
speech ... includes the right to attempt to persuade others to change their
views, and may not be curtailed simply because the speaker's message may
be offensive to his audience."66 For the dissenters, though, this acknowl-
edgement made the majority's decision all the more troubling. Justice Ken-
nedy highlighted the fact that the restrictions in question expressly singled
out for regulation precisely those activities that should be of paramount
First Amendment concern, namely, "counseling," "education," and persua-
sion. Particularly in the abortion context, he complained, it is essential that
citizens be afforded an expansive freedom to change others' minds. After
all, "[aibsent the ability to ask the government to intervene, citizens who
oppose abortion must seek to convince their fellow citizens of the moral
imperative of their cause."' 67 He continued:
[W]e have but little time to find truth through discourse. No bet-
ter illustration of the immediacy of speech, of the urgency of per-
suasion, of the preciousness of time, is presented than in this case.
Here the citizens who claim First Amendment protection seek it
for speech which, if it is to be effective, must take place at the
very time and place a grievous moral wrong, in their view, is
62. See Breyer, supra n. 35.
63. 458 U.S. at 910 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)).
64. Id.
65. Hill v. Col., 530 U.S. 703 (2000). I believe that Hill was wrongly decided. Cf id. at 741
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority's misapplication of the relevant First Amend-
ment doctrines was so striking as to justify the lament that the Court was employing an "'ad hoc
nullification machine' to push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way
of that highly favored practice [i.e., abortion]").
66. Id. at 716.
67. Id. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 741-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Having deprived abortion opponents of the political right to persuade the electorate that abortion
should be restricted by law, the Court today continues and expands its assault upon their individ-
ual right to persuade women contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.").
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about to occur. The Court tears away from the protesters the
guarantees of the First Amendment when they most need it. So
committed is the Court to its course that it denies these protesters,
in the face of what they consider to be one of life's gravest moral
crises, even the opportunity to try to offer a fellow citizen a little
pamphlet, a handheld paper seeking to reach a higher law.68
To be clear, the foregoing is not offered as an exhaustive chronicling
of the Court's invocation of persuasion in free-speech cases. The point is
not to construct and defend a grand theory, but only to highlight a promi-
nent, influential theme. Whatever other values the First Amendment might
serve, and however it should be understood and applied, it is fair to say that
a special concern and respect for the activity of changing minds has in-
formed and profoundly shaped our free-speech law and rhetoric.6 9
III.
Turn back to the problem of "proselytism" and its regulation. What,
exactly, are we talking about? What is proselytism, and why should
human-rights lawyers, religious believers, and citizens in liberal democra-
cies care and worry about it? Is proselytism an activity that should be iden-
tified by its tone or methods? By its purpose or effects? Or by something
else? To make a long story short, it turns out that "proselytism" is "an
equivocal term, rife with misapplications."7 What's more, as Lawrence
Uzzell has noted, "[als with 'fascism' in the 1960s and 'terrorism' today,
the definition of 'proselytism' seems to grow less and less precise the more
often the word is used." 7 1
Now, one fairly accessible and straightforward definition might go
something like this: "'[P]roselytism' means expressive conduct undertaken
with the purpose of trying to change the religious beliefs, affiliation, or
identity of another."' 72 In sophisticated circles, however, the connotations
of the term are almost always more negative, even sinister.73 For many of
68. Id. at 792 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. To be clear: To say that a concern and respect for the activity of changing minds has
powerfully shaped our First Amendment doctrine and discourse is not to claim that proselytism is
categorically exempt from regulation. See generally Hunter & Price, supra n. 23.
70. Lawrence Uzzell, Don't Call It Proselytism, 146 First Things 14 (Oct. 2004) (quoting
Bert Beach, Evangelism and Proselytism: Religious Liberty and Ecumenical Challenges, http:/!
www.irla.org/documents/articles/bbbeach-proselytism.html (Sept. 8, 1999) ("Proselytism is wit-
ness and evangelism aimed at conversion. Proselytism is false or corrupt witness, using wrong
methods. Proselytism is sheep-stealing with a view to enlarging one's own church and empire-
building, using false motivation. Proselytism is evangelizing the wrong people, using false
targets. Proselytism is interfering with the belief and religious life of other people .... Prosely-
tism is keeping people ignorant about real faith and religion .....
71. Uzzell, supra n. 70.
72. Stahnke, supra n. 23.
73. Id. at 254-55.
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us, "[t]he picture of the proselytizer is of some latter-day Savonarola, severe
and intimidating, or an Elmer Gantry-type huckster."74 New York Times
columnist Nicholas Kristof captured the typical "right thinking" reaction
well: "Mention the words 'evangelical missionary,' and many Americans
conjure up an image of redneck zealots forcing starving children to be bap-
tized before they get a few crusts of bread."7 5 And even in the pages of the
U.S. Reports, the word is invoked, but rarely defined; it is usually thought
to be enough to suggest a distinction between proselytism and more innocu-
ous, perhaps less religious, expressive activity.76
In fact, terms like "proselytism" and "proselytize" descend to us from
a Greek word (proselutos) meaning "one who has come to a place" or "one
who comes over." A more faithful image of the "proselytizer," then, might
be one of a guide-or even a friend-extending an invitation, or providing
companionship and counsel on a journey. True, as Paul Griffiths notes, the
convert "leaves an old community, whether of belief or practice, and enters
a new one";77 but it would not seem that we are etymologically required to
regard him as doing so reluctantly, desperately, or alone. It is probably also
helpful to remember that, in many Christian circles, "proselytism" is casu-
ally and commonly understood as "evangelism." This suggests that to
"proselytize" is not just to argue, but also to proclaim the "good news."7 8
Proselytism is more than advocacy; it is the transmission of a religious mes-
sage, which in turn prompts the transformation of the hearer. In this sense,
proselytism-as-evangelism goes beyond the spoken word and includes what
Cardinal Dulles calls "a lifelong process of letting the gospel permeate...
all our ideas and attitudes."79 And a rich, non-cartoonish definition of
"proselytism" would try to capture the idea that it involves not only the
74. Griffiths & Elshtain, supra n. 5, at 36.
75. Nicholas D. Kristof, God on Their Side, N.Y. Times A15 (Sept. 27, 2003).
76. See e.g. Good News Club v. Milford Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 130-34 (2001) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (distinguishing "proselytism" from "speech from a religious viewpoint"); cf id. at 121
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("What is at play here is not coercion, but the compulsion of ideas-and
the private right to exert and receive that compulsion (or to have one's children receive it) is
protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, not banned by the Establishment Clause.
A priest has as much liberty to proselytize as a patriot.").
77. Griffiths & Elshtain, supra n. 5, at 30.
78. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, The Gospels, http://www.nccbuscc.org/nabbible/gos-
pels.htm (accessed Sept. 19, 2005) (The English word "gospel" is translated from the Greek term
euangelion, or "good news." And, "evangelization" is obviously connected to euangelizomai,
which means "to proclaim good news.").
79. Avery Dulles, Evangelizing Theology, 61 First Things 27 (Mar. 1996); see also e.g. Doc-
uments of the Second Vatican Council, Lumen Gentium, No. 35 (Nov. 21, 1964) (available at
http://www.vatican.va/archivelhist-councils/ii-vatican-councilldocuments/vat-ii-const- 19641121
_lumen-gentium en.html) (referring to evangelization as "[the] announcing of Christ by a living
testimony as well as by the spoken word"); Catholic News Agency, Evangelize Asia with Faith
that Penetrates Every Aspect of Life, Says Pope, http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?
n=2505 (Nov. 19, 2004) (quoting Pope John Paul II's statement that "the Kingdom of God must
be proclaimed with 'a silent witness of life,' carrying the cross and following in the footsteps of
the suffering and crucified Christ").
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dissemination of information, but the proclamation of Truth-as Truth-
and the extension of an invitation to embrace that Truth. The proselytizer is
not just "expressing" ideas, or proposing claims; he is making disciples and
changing minds. As John Paul II put it, "The proclamation of the Word of
God has Christian conversion as its aim: a complete and sincere adherence
to Christ and his Gospel through faith."8 °
Now, "proselytism" so understood is almost certain to be controver-
sial, since it can only jar our pervasive modem indifferentism, and to upset
those "lukewarm relativists" whose "need is for psychological defenses and
social barriers against those who would vigorously advocate eternal
truths."'" After all, as Paul Griffiths has noted,
To engage in proselytizing implies a moral judgment of error (in
assent) or impropriety (in action) on the part of [those] being
proselytized .. . . Particular proselytisms, then, imply (and are
sometimes explicit about) the rightness or propriety of what they
proselytize on behalf of, and, concomitantly, the wrongness or
impropriety of what they proselytize against.82
To his "lukewarm" critics, then, the proselytizer's offense lies in failing to
evidence an appropriately skeptical or ironic detachment from the merits of
his message. 8
3
All that said, there is no escaping the run-of-the-mill, colloquial, dis-
paraging sense of the term. For many, unworthy methods, unwarranted
confidence, and excessive zeal are necessarily included in the very defini-
tion of proselytism. To "proselytize" is to proclaim one's message in a
certain way-a way that is thought to threaten or insult the freedom of the
hearer, and perhaps also the dignity of the proselytizer's message. Thus,
"proselytism" has been defined as "evangelistic malpractice,"84 as "counter-
witness,"8 5 and as an "offense against the authentic nature of religion."86
80. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, at No. 46.
81. Uzzell, supra n. 70, at 15.
82. Griffiths, supra n. 5, at 32.
83. Cf Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 827-28 (2000) (plurality) (warning that the Court
should not "reserve special hostility for those who take religion seriously [and] who think that
their religion should affect the whole of their lives"). On the other hand, there is reason to think
that among Americans who are religious believers-and even among "born-again Christians"-
the "modem orthodoxies of tolerance and inclusion" have more appeal than "traditional teach-
ings" regarding evangelization and salvation. Dave Shiflett, Uncertain Crusaders, Wall St. J.
W 15 (Nov. 14, 2003) (available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/taste/?id= 110004301); see gen-
erally e.g. Alan Wolfe, The Transformation of American Religion: How We Actually Live Our
Faith (Free Press 2003); Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in
the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 1645, 1660-69 (2004).
84. Lerner, Proselytism, Change of Religion, and Intl. Human Rights, supra n. 23, at 495.
85. His Beatitude Teoctist, Patriarch of the Orthodox Church of Romania, Address, Address
of His Beatitude Teoctist (Vatican City, Rome, Oct. 12, 2002) (available at http://www.vatican.va/
latest/documents/teoctist spe 20021012en.html) ("Proselytism is a counter-witness and must be
denounced as such in every circumstance.").
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Now, to reject "evangelistic malpractice" seems easy and wise enough.
The danger, of course, is that definitions and critiques that focus on the
proselytizer's "unworthy methods"-e.g., "coercion," "manipulation,"
"propaganda"-will shade into condemnations of the evangelical mission
itself Thus, Jean Bethke Elshtain has observed that proselytism's critics
tend to "disdain[ ] distinctions between coercion, manipulation, and persua-
sion." For these critics, "[i]f I change my mind about something after an
encounter with you, or after having spent some time in your religious com-
munity, the presupposition is that I have been messed with: gulled or brain-
washed or taken for the proverbial walk down the primrose path."8 7 It is,
perhaps, too easy for those appropriately concerned with coercion-and
with remaining true to the Gospel while proclaiming it-to confuse one
who converts or "comes over" with one who is duped or dragged.
Even more troubling is the fact that some unfriendly definitions of
"proselytism" seem to reflect not just disapproval of the proselytizer's
methods, but also hostility toward her message. On this view, what is ob-
jectionable about the proselytizer is not merely her canniness or her zeal,
but her claims and her commitments. "Proselytism" becomes, then, just a
code word for "expression that we find offensive" or "claims that we re-
ject." It serves as little more than a proxy for the demand that religion
remain private, a demand which itself often reflects discomfort with the
claim or premise that religious beliefs can be true. In turn, Elshtain ob-
serves, "the continuing privatizing of religion means that when religion
shows its face it must not take the form of actually trying to persuade some-
one else of the truth of the religious beliefs being displayed."8 8 And yet, for
many religious believers, it is-in Cardinal Dulles's words-"essential that
faith be true."'8 9
Another way, perhaps, to get a handle on "proselytism" is to look not
only at methods, or at the content of the message, but also and more specifi-
cally at the harms it is thought to cause. Many such harms are cited in both
the scholarly and the polemical literature, and I will mention here just a
86. Pope John Paul II, Speech, Address to H.E. Mrs. Sarala Manourie Fernando, Ambassa-
dor of the Republic Sri Lanka to the Holy See (Vatican City, Rome, May 27, 2004) (available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/2004/may/documents/hf-jp-ii-spe- 2004
0527_ambassador-sri-lanka en.html) (The pope rejected "proselytization" understood as "the at-
tempt to violate another person's freedom of conscience through moral or financial coercion.
Such acts represent an offense against the authentic nature of religion.").
87. Griffiths & Elshtain, supra n. 5, at 35.
88. Id.
89. As Dulles notes,
For [Biblical authors and classical theologians] it is essential that faith be true, for it gets
its saving power from its reliance on the only power that can effectively vanquish the
destructive forces of sin and death. Faith, in other words, saves by reason of its object.
If we were not convinced that salvation comes from the God who speaks His saving
word in Christ, we could perhaps be good therapists or social engineers but not
evangelists.
Dulles, supra n. 79.
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few. First, on what might be called the "personal" or "individual" level,
proselytism is often said to threaten the hearer's right to privacy, her relig-
ious liberty (that is, her right to hold religious beliefs without interference
or coercion), and-more generally-her freedom of conscience. Second,
and on what could be called the "political" or "public" level, the dangers
thought to attend proselytism tend to involve alleged distortions of public
debate, insults, or challenges to the dominant or established local religion,
instigation of civil unrest or political dissent, and imperialistic assaults on
local cultures' traditions.
Starting with the "individual" level, I submit that a legally operative
definition of "proselytism" built on claims about the hearers' "right to pri-
vacy" should be a non-starter, at least outside the hearer's private sphere,
narrowly understood. In the public square anyway, there really is, generally
speaking, no "right to be left alone," or to be protected from challenging,
irritating, and even offensive expression. As Justice Harlan once insisted,
the "State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us," and the Consti-
tution places tight constraints on the ability of government to "shut off dis-
course solely to protect others from hearing it .... " In any event, as
Griffiths reminds us,
Proselytism ... is virtually unavoidable .... It may be possible
for those almost or entirely without connection to others (hermits,
those at the far end of autism or Alzheimer's, long-term coma
patients, and so on) to avoid proselytism completely; but other-
wise we are all proselytizers .... Being such is inseparable from
having a social existence. 91
So "privacy," or a desire to be "let alone," or the possibility of "of-
fense," are not particularly helpful either in defining proselytism or in justi-
fying its regulation. (This is not to deny of course that those who engage in
evangelism, proselytism, or advocacy of any kind should, if only out of
prudence and good manners, respect the privacy and space of their intended
hearers.) 92 What, then, about the other "individual" level harms associated
90. Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15, 25, 21 (1971); see also Hill, 530 U.S. at 751 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("We have consistently held that the Constitution does not permit government to de-
cide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for
the unwilling listener or viewer." (citation omitted)); but cf. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716-17 ("The unwill-
ing listener's interest in avoiding unwanted communication... is an aspect of the broader 'right to
be let alone' that one of our wisest Justices characterized as 'the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men.'" (quoting Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
91. Griffiths & Elshtain, supra n. 5, at 31.
92. Witte, A Primer on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism, supra n. 20, at 627-28 (con-
cluding that "[t]he preferred solution to the modem problem of proselytism is not so much further
state restriction but further self-restraint" and observing that "[t]his is the heart of the Golden
Rule").
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with proselytism? Does proselytism threaten-and should it be defined in
opposition to-the freedoms of conscience and religion?
The work and thought of Pope John Paul II suggest a way to mediate
the apparent tension between expression, persuasion, and evangelization, on
the one hand, and religious liberty, freedom of conscience, and human dig-
nity on the other. As was noted earlier, John Paul II put the call to evangel-
ization at the heart of his ministry, convinced as he was of the "urgency of
missionary activity."93 Far from being optional-far from being, in Profes-
sor Stephen Carter's famous words, a "hobby" 94-the "missionary thrust
• . .belongs to the very nature of the Christian life."95 As a result, "[n]o
believer in Christ, no institution of the Church can avoid this supreme duty:
to proclaim Christ to all peoples," inviting them to "open the doors to
Christ" and to change their minds.9 6
At the same time, the Pope spoke out clearly and often against any
corruption of the Christian witness by appeal to what the Second Vatican
Council called "coercion or... devices unworthy of the Gospel."97 Is there
a contradiction here? Can the Pope so enthusiastically celebrate missionary
evangelism while at the same time criticizing proselytism? After all, in
today's context, and to many liberal listeners, the Pope's words can only
sound like a troubling call to arms, to intolerance, to cultural imperialism,
and even-horrors!-to judgmentalism. The purpose of this call, though, is
not to gain an edge in a global inter-faith competition for souls or to run
triumphantly roughshod over non-Western cultures. It is, instead, to
serve-"to serve man by revealing to him the love of God made manifest in
Jesus Christ," and to "direct [his] gaze ... toward the mystery of Christ."9
But again, how could the Pope simultaneously call for a new evangeli-
zation and warn against proselytism?99 The key is his rich understanding of
93. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, at No. 1.
94. Stephen L. Carter, Evolutionism, Creationism, and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987
Duke L.J. 977 (1987).
95. Pope John Paul 11, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, No. 1 (emphasis added); see also
Pope Paul VI, Evangelii nuntiandi, No. 5 ("[T]he presentation of the Gospel message is not an
optional contribution for the Church. It is the duty incumbent on her by the command of the Lord
Jesus, so that people can believe and be saved.").
96. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13 at No. 3.
97. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis humanae, No. 11 (Dec. 7, 1965) (available at http://www.vati-
can.va/archive/histcouncils/iivatican council/documents/vat-iidecl 19651207_dignitatis-
humanaeen.html).
98. Pope John Paul 1I, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, at No. 2, 4.
99. For example, John Paul II expressed concern about what he regarded as the aggressive
tactics and uncharitable, deceptive claims employed by members of some Protestant "sects" in the
developing world. See e.g. Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia in America, No. 73 (Jan. 22, 1999) (availa-
ble at http://www vatican.vafholy-father/john-paul-ii/apost-exhortations/documentshf.-jp-ii-
exh_22011999_ecclesia-in-americaen.html). Pope John Paul II notes,
The proselytizing activity of the sects and new religious groups in many parts of
America is a grave hindrance to the work of evangelization. The word "proselytism"
has a negative meaning when it indicates a way of winning followers which does not
respect the freedom of those to whom a specific kind of religious propaganda is di-
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freedom. As the fathers at the Second Vatican Council proclaimed-and as
the Pope often re-affirmed-"the human person has a right to religious free-
dom," and so no one should be forced to act against his conscience in relig-
ious matters nor prevented from acting according to his conscience ...
However,
[p]roclaiming Christ and bearing witness to him, when done in a
way that respects conscience[ ], does not violate freedom. Faith
demands a free adherence on the part of man, but at the same time
faith must be offered to him .... [A]Ill are impelled by their own
nature and are bound by a moral obligation to seek truth, above
all religious truth."' 1
Properly understood, authentic freedom is not immunity from persuasion or
obligation, or from the sometimes unsettling invitation to "come over." The
claim, instead, is that evangelization liberates the hearer because it gives
him the power to say "no." ' Indeed, "true liberation consists in opening
oneself to the love of Christ."' 3 Thus, the same freedom that is exercised
by the evangelist is enjoyed also by the hearer, who is extended an opportu-
nity to embrace true freedom and authentic human flourishing."° The
Pope's moral anthropology-his view about what human persons are and
are for-goes a long way toward untangling the knots identified by prosely-
tism's critics.1
0 5
What, then, about the harms said to attend, and even to define, "prose-
lytism" at the "public" or "political" level-harms to the civic order, to the
public square, to vulnerable cultures, and to the status and authority of lo-
cally dominant religions? A recent news account, for example, reports that
"[the hill tribes of northern Thailand have survived centuries of displace-
rected. The Catholic Church in America is critical of proselytism by the sects and, for
this reason, rejects methods of this kind in her own evangelizing work.
Id.
100. Pope Paul VI, Dignitatis humanae, supra n. 97, at No. 2.
101. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, at No. 8; id. at No. 4 ("Does not
respect for conscience and for freedom exclude all efforts at conversion?").
102. Cf Norman K. Miles, Proselytism and Religious Freedom in the Seventh-Day Adventist
Church, in Sharing the Book: Religious Perspectives on the Rights and Wrongs of Proselytism
305, 319 (John Witte, Jr. & Richard C. Martin eds., 1999) ("In the end, only those who are free to
say no to the gospel are really free to say yes.").
103. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, at No. I1; see also John Paul 11,
Speech, Pastoral Visit in Kazakhstan: Meeting with Young People, (Astana-Eurasia University,
Sept. 23, 2001) (available at http:/www.vatican.valholy-father/john-pauliilspeeches/200l/sep-
tember/documents/hf.jp-ii-spe_20010923_kazakhstan-astana-youth en.html) ("Allow me to pro-
fess before you with humility and pride the faith of Christians .... Only in the encounter with
him, the Word made flesh, do we find the fullness of self-realization and happiness.").
104. See e.g. Griffiths & Elshtain, supra n. 5, at 35-36 ("Persuasion ...begins with the
presupposition that you are a moral agent, a being whose dignity no one is permitted to deny or to
strip from you, and, from that stance of mutual respect, one offers arguments, or invites your
participation, your sharing, in a community and its rhythms and rituals.").
105. For more on the "moral anthropology" of Pope John Paul II, see John J. Coughlin, Pope
John Paul II and the Dignity of the Human Being, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 65 (2003).
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ment, hardship and discrimination. But now their uniquely colorful culture
is under a new threat, albeit a well-meaning one: Christian evangelism."' 16
(Apparently, "[t]ourists don't want to see these tribal people with a church
foisted on them.") 0 7 These harms should not be exaggerated, but they
should not be ignored either.'08 It might be worth recalling here the discus-
sion above about the values that underlie and have shaped our free-speech
law and traditions. It was suggested that, at its best, our First Amendment
decisions and doctrine have celebrated and protected speech precisely be-
cause it persuades, moves, changes, and transforms; and, that the point of
the freedom of speech-properly understood-is not to protect hearers
from the burdens of argument, but rather to authorize and enable inspired
conversions, transformed views, and changed minds. In all but the most
pressing cases, then, our free-speech law gives priority to persuasion-and,
we might say, to proselytism-over enforced political tranquility, the com-
fort of the culture, and the privileges of established orthodoxies. And, it
would seem, this is as it should be. After all, "culture is a human creation
and is therefore marked by sin, it too, needs to be 'healed, ennobled and
perfected.' ,,o What's more, "[n]o religious and cultural tradition is ever
frozen ... and for local traditions to seek blanket protections against prose-
lytism is a self-defeating policy of ossification."' 10
CONCLUSION
Our free-speech law provides support for the claim that persuasion and
proselytism should not be subordinated, in terms of rights or value, to unity
and stability. That said, there are trends and arguments that point in the
other direction. For example, we could once say with some confidence that
the First Amendment denies any power to government to reshape or fine-
tune the public conversation in the interest of political stability or to pro-
duce a "better" public discourse. We could once be fairly confident that the
Constitution served to keep government regulation out of the arena of per-
106. Marwaan Macan-Markar, Christian Conversion Threatens Hill Tribe Culture, Asia
Times (Aug. 29, 2003) (available at http://www.atimes.comiatimes/SoutheastAsia/
EH29Ae0 I.html).
107. Id.; see also e.g. Disrupting the Faith? Interview with Dr. Alexander Berzin, Newsweek
(Asia & Atlantic Eds.) 56 (Jan. 13, 1997) (discussing the threats to Mongolian culture, "traditional
values," and Buddhism posed by the "very large influx of American Christian missionaries.").
108. See e.g. David M. Smolin, Exporting the First Amendment? Evangelism, Proselytism,
and the International Religious Freedom Act, 31 Cumb. L. Rev. 685, 707 (2000-01) ("We cannot
denigrate the importance of religion to the social order or to civil peace in the name of religious
liberty."); Makau Wa Mutua, Limitations on Religious Rights: Problematizing Religious Freedom
in the African Context, in Johan D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr., Religious Human Rights in
Global Perspective 417-40 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1996) (calling for "mechanisms of re-
dress for forms of proselytization that seek to unfairly assimilate or impose dominant cultures on
indigenous religion").
109. Pope John Paul II, Redemptoris missio, supra n. 13, at No. 54.
110. Witte, Human Rights and the Right to Proselytize, supra n. 6, at 184.
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suasion, not to authorize government supervision of or intrusions into that
arena, in the name of "improving the marketplace of ideas" or protecting
hearers from unwanted and uncomfortable challenges. 11' And we could un-
til recently expect widespread recognition that dissension and division-
even what the Court has called "political division along religious
lines"' 2-are the inevitable and unremarkable results of free speech, not
reasons for limiting it. In recent years, however, and in a number of con-
texts, both judges and commentators have invoked and relied on the notion
that the First Amendment should be understood and applied so as to avoid,
and even to censor, "divisiveness." '13  It is suggested-particularly in the
context of election- and campaign-related regulations-that the perceived
needs and integrity of our political processes, and the asserted obligation to
encourage or amplify the speech or comfort of some, justifies controlling
the expression of others."l 4 I have argued elsewhere that such arguments
and suggestions are misguided."' 5 For now, it is enough to say that, just as
the prominence long given in free-speech discourse to efforts at changing
minds is helpful in understanding, and perhaps in dissolving, the tension
between proselytism and privacy, and between the evangelist's freedom of
111. See e.g. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he concept that gov-
ernment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."). In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian and Bisexual Group, the Court notes,
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce thoughts and
statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the First Amend-
ment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of
orthodox expression. The Speech Clause has no more certain antithesis. While the law
is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or dis-
couraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the
government.
Hurley, 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995). See also Stahnke, supra n. 20, at 266 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court
protected the freedom to proselytize even though at times the message and the manner in which it
was delivered was intolerant, divisive and abusive, and could disturb the targets in their own
religious feelings and in their tolerance of others.").
112. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
113. See e.g. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 723-24 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(avoiding "religiously based social conflict" and "social dissension" is a fundamental First
Amendment "principle"); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 195, 198 (1992) (noting that the Establishment Clause "extinguished ...inter-
denominational strife"); id. at 209-10 (contending that the Establishment Clause forbids certain
government measures "because [they] cause profound divisiveness and offense") (emphasis
added).
114. See e.g. Breyer, supra n. 35, at 252-53 ("[Tlhe First Amendment's constitutional role is
not simply one of protecting the individual's 'negative' freedom from governmental restraint. The
Amendment in context also forms a necessary part of a constitutional system designed to sustain
that democratic self-government. The Amendment helps to sustain the democratic process both
by encouraging the exchange of ideas needed to make sound electoral decisions and by encourag-
ing an exchange of views among ordinary citizens necessary to their informed participation in the
electoral process.").
115. Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the Constitution, __ Geo. L.J. __ (forth-
coming 2006).
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speech and the hearer's freedom of conscience, the increasing prominence
of free-speech arguments that appear to privilege comfort and stasis over
persuasion and conversion should serve as a reminder that the invitation to
"come over" is, has been, and likely will always be, unsettling.
